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The subject of this article is theprimafacie case for judicial invali-
dation of the exercise of state or local land use authority because it is a
taking of private property without due process of law. First, the histor-
ical evolution of the constitutional standards for determining whether
the application of a zoning ordinance is invalid is traced through four
stages from Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. I to the present. Sec-
ond, the influence of academic commentators in defining what is a tak-
ing is explained in light of the Supreme Court's inability to develop a
coherent taking jurisprudence. Third, two cases-one federal and one
state-will be analyzed in depth to show the influence of the tests. The
first, naturally, is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.
2
Penn Central contains all of the conventional judicial wisdom about
wht constitutes a taking. Penn Central is then contrasted with a recent
Illinois Supreme Court case, Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Duggan .
3
Dugan involves almost the same issue as Penn Central but reaches the
opposite result.
The question "what is a taking?" can be more accurately stated as
"when is the exercise of the police power invalid?" Commentators per-
sist in analyzing the issue in traditional real property concepts, but such
an effort is too narrow in an era of pervasive government regulation.
4
All exercises of the police power must be tested by constitutional stan-
dards. Until the recent explosion of new constitutional theories of zon-
* This article is an edited version of a talk presented at the land use continuing education
program "What you don't know about Zoning can Hurt You!" held at liT/Chicago-Kent College
of Law.
** Professor of Law, lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B., L.L.B., Stanford University.
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978). The court subsequently decided
two other land use cases, but has avoided reaching the merits. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See also
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, (1980).
3. 105 Ill. App. 3d 839, 435 N.E.2d 130 (1981), af'd, 95 I11. 2d 516, 449 N.E.2d 69 (1983).
4. A distinction has recently been drawn between invalid exercises of the police power and
de facto condemnations for purposes of deciding whether traditional equitable remedies are ade-
quate or whether money damages should be awarded. Professor Freilich has argued that eminent
domain "involves the acquisition of possessory or legal rights in property because of its need for
the public use while the latter involves the public regulation of property to prevent the use thereof
in a manner that is detrimental to the public interest." Freilich, Solving the "'Taking" Equation.-
Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 URB. LAW 447, 461 (1983). This is a false
distinction, see infra note 12, and contributes nothing to the damages versus injunction debate.
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ing litigation, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were the most
fruitful constitutional challenges to the exercise of the police power.
The open-ended standards contained in these clauses allowed the
courts to invalidate zoning ordinances for a variety of vague and incon-
sistent reasons. But, courts were unsuccessful in articulating a coherent
theory of constitutional review of zoning ordinances because constitu-
tional challenges to the exercise of the police power force the courts to
answer a question that is at the center of modem political discourse-
what are the proper and improper purposes of public action?
A. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ZONING FROM
EUCLID TO THE PRESENT
When zoning was proposed between 1909-1920, the major issue
was whether it would be found to be constitutional. The great case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 5 answered the question: is a
comprehensive zoning ordinance constitutional? After reargument, the
Court held that "reasonable" comprehensive ordinances are presump-
tively constitutional.6 Two years later, the Supreme Court introduced
the second phase of the constitutional law of zoning. Nectow v. City of
Cambridge7 held that a zoning ordinance can be a taking if it is unrea-
sonably applied to a specific tract. Illinois is still basically in the
Nectow phase. These two phases, Euclid and Nectow, were the consti-
tutional law of zoning well into the late 60's and early 70's. Most state
zoning law took its cue from these two cases, and lawyers had to try
and decide when one or the other applied.
In the 1970's there was an attempt to constitutionalize radically the
law of zoning around the notion that much local zoning discriminated
on the basis of race and wealth.8 Out of this effort came an attempt to
change zoning from a state to a federal law based on theories of ex-
panded application of constitutional scrutiny. This third stage by and
large existed more in theory than in practice except in a few mid-Atlan-
tic states. The Supreme Court and lower courts did not enthusiastically
accept the invitation to become local zoning bodies and local planning
commissions, except where there was proof of intentional racial dis-
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. Id. The events leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in Euclid are briefly described
in Tarlock, Euclid Revisited, 34 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4 (1982). The standard history of
the decision is S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICA (1969).
7. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
8. See R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 795-835 (1981).
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crimination. 9 Recently, a fourth phase of constitutional zoning law has
emerged. This phase has been marked by the application of three dif-
ferent kinds of principles to zoning decisions. First, constitutional prin-
ciples such as the First Amendment, that were once not thought to be
applicable or very applicable, have been applied to local zoning deci-
sions. Second, Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187 110 has been
applied to the local zoning process. Third, new non-constitutional stat-
utes are applied to the zoning process. The recent application of anti-
trust law to zoning is the most striking illustration. The breadth of this
last phase can be illustrated by contrasting it to the law of judicial re-
view of zoning ordinances in Illinois. The contrast shows the poten-
tially new lines of attack not available under traditional law.
The Illinois law is a fairly straightforward example of substantive
due process administered by the courts. The Illinois courts have always
looked to five factors to determine whether a zoning ordinance is con-
stitutional. I" These are: (1) the character of the neighborhood, (2) the
use to which nearby property is put, (3) the extent to which property
values are diminished by the ordinance, (4) the gain to the public, (5) as
compared to the hardship to the individual. 12 The so-called LaSalle
Bank factors are straight substantive due process because the courts
use judicial review of zoning ordinances to second guess the planning
and zoning job done by the municipality. Basically, Illinois law allows
cities in the early stages of development to have some say in how the
city is developed, but as more development occurs it becomes harder to
make regulatory decisions that buck the market.
Although Illinois is widely perceived as an anti-regulatory state, a
recent statistical analysis of the rate of reversal of Illinois zoning cases
compared to those of surrounding states found that "Illinois courts are
not invalidating zoning ordinances at an unusually high rate."' 13 Re-
cent appellate cases bear out the impression that the courts are becom-
ing more sympathetic to land use regulation justified by plans or other
evidence that the city has some valid land use objective in mind. 14 As
the LaSalle Bank test softens, the significance of new avenues of chal-
9. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1978).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
I1. LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 111. 2d 344, 125 N.E.2d 609 (1955). See also
LaSalle National Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 111. 2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974).
12. Id. at 613.
13. Goldenberg, Illinois Courts on Zoning. Today, Are They Really That Dierent? (1983)
(Unpublished paper on file with the Cm. KENT. L. REV.).
14. See, e.g., Forstview Homeowners Ass'n. v. County of Cook. 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 309
N.E.2d 763 (1974); First National Bank of Highland Park v. Village of Vernon Hills, 55 Ill. App.
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lenge increases. The use of the First Amendment to attack billboard
and amenity regulations of Section 1983 to obtain damages as opposed
to an injunction voiding the existing zoning, and of the anti-trust laws
to allege a municipal-developer conspiracy to use zoning to restrict
competition offer opportunities for litigation beyond LaSalle Bank.
Current Supreme Court doctrine attempts to isolate those in-
stances where government regulation places excessive burdens on an
individual's enjoyment of his property. The court currently distin-
guishes between physical and non-physical regulatory invasions.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 15 invalidated an ad-
ministrative decision taken pursuant to a New York statute that re-
quired apartment owners to permit the installation of CATV wires in
return for a $1.00 fee fixed by a state commission. The New York
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the "easement" fee,
relying on Fred F French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York16 and
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.' 7 The Supreme
Court reversed in a 6-3 decision. A permanent physical occupation is a
taking regardless of an offsetting public interest.' 8 Although the Court
now applies aper se rule for physical invasions, an ad hoc balancing
test applies to "regulatory" takings.
For "regulatory" takings the basic allegation is that the zoning de-
prives one of the ability to use profitably his property and, therefore,
violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitu-
tional and analogous state constitutional amendments. This straight-
forward challenge has two advantages, one procedural and one
substantive. In Illinois it has a major procedural advantage because
Illinois is one of the few states that has a well-developed requirement
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and in many cases an allega-
3d 985, 371 N.E.2d 659 (1977); and Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 11. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d
426 (1981).
15. 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982). See Morgan, Recent Supreme Court Decisions. Implications for the
Taking Issue, 35 LAND USE L. ZONING DIG. 4 (1983). Loretto has been criticized by Professor
Costonis because it gives undue weight to one factor in deciding whether there has been a taking.
Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 465 (1983). Professor Stoebuck has recently argued that the cases where non-trespassory
takings have been found can be explained as the forced transfers of either affirmative or negative
easements. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057
(1980). Since all police power regulations can be characterized as the public's acquisition of a
property interest, Professor Stoebuck's line between taking and regulation does not hold. See
Humbach, A Uniying Theor, for the Just-Compensation Cases. Takings, Regulation and Public
Use, 34 RUT. L. REV. 243, 250-251 (1982).
16. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
17. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
18. 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).
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tion that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional in its entirety will allow
one to avoid exhaustion.' 9 The substantive advantage of the allegation
is that it allows in a great deal of evidence that permits the court to
second-guess the decision that was made by planners and the local zon-
ing authorities. Theprimafade taking case alleges that no matter how
wonderful, how thoughtful, how elegant the zoning is as applied to a
specific piece of property, it is unconstitutional because it shrinks too
much value from the property and thus substantive due process re-
quires relief to the landowner. Traditionally, relief was restricted to an
injunction that often allowed the city to play games by responding with
minor changes in the invalid ordinance. 20 Today, the possibilities of
the damages and specific relief require more sophisticated municipal
responses to an invalidation.
What does it mean to say that too much value is shrunk from the
property? There is no general answer to this question except to litigate
it parcel by parcel and see what a court holds. There are at least three
definitions of too much, and these are the definitions around which the
evidence of taking is always organized. The first is that a zoning ordi-
nance is unconstitutional because it does not allow the highest and best
use of property as defined by appraisers. 2' The second definition
mixes, as most zoning cases do, substantive due process with equal pro-
tection claims. 22 This approach compares the use allowed for a partic-
ular property under the zoning ordinance with the use allowed from
similarly situated properties and argues that the similarity with the
nearby properties represents an irrational allocation of uses in the area.
A third definition, which is applicable to many down zoning cases, is a
"before and after" comparison. Cities only used to zone up but now
cities are revising their expectations downward, as is everyone else, and
are engaging in down zoning, which tends to reduce the development
potential of affected property.
If the numbers and visuals are good on any of these three allega-
tions, the land owner will have made a strong case for judicial relief
unless the city can interpose an equally strong defense of the zoning
ordinance. A city basically has two rejoinders to the primafade case.
The first is "we only stubbed your toe as opposed to cut it off." That is,
you're not as bad off as you claim because under the existing zoning
19. Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, 74 111. 2d 80, 383 N.E.2d 964 (1978); and Bright
v. City of Evanston, 10 111. 2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1956).
20. 'See R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS, 151-152 (1981).
21. Id. at 134.
22. Id. at 100-107.
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ordinance the property can be profitably developed. The second de-
fense is "so we did cut off your toe, we had a right to do this in the
greater public interest." The first defense is simply a battle of apprais-
ers, and the court must decide whose appraisers are better. The second
issue is the most difficult issue because the city concedes that the value
of the property was lowered compared to the value that can be ob-
tained through development, but it claims that that impairment was
privileged.
B. THE ACADEMIC DEBATE OVER WHAT CONSTITUTES A TAKING
Ultimately deciding what constitutes a privileged impairment of
property takes one to the core of political theory that attempts to ra-
tionalize the modem state with the notion of individual dignity. There
are three basic propositions that help in some small way to define and
limit this judicial task. Proposition one is that there is no law of what
constitutes taking.23 The Supreme Court admitted this vacuum in Penn
Central. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, said that the
Supreme Court had been unable to develop any." 'set formula' for de-
termining when justice and fairness requires that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the Government. ,"24
and his opinion proves the point. Proposition two is that over the years
various academic commentators have attempted to do what the
Supreme Court has been unable to do. They have tried to develop, if
not a set formula, standards for distinguishing between good and bad
regulations. These theories are not only of academic interest; the courts
have been forced to turn to academic commentators because of the in-
tellectual bankruptcy of the judicial doctrines used by the courts, al-
though the results reached by the cases are often rational and
defensible. These theories now control the taking debate. The third
proposition is that taking doctrine has evolved through four stages and
only recently has the issue become important as the scope of land use
regulation has intensified. The relatively recent emergence of the tak-
ing issues as an important constitutional law problem further explains
the inadequacies of the Court's several attempts to develop coherent
doctrine.
In the early stages of our country, takings were not an issue. There
was too little government activity, too much land for anybody to worry
23. See Girard, Constitutional Takings Clauses and the Regulation of Private Property: Part I,
34 LAND USE L. ZONING DIG. 4, 607 (1982).
24. 438 U.S. at 124.
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about government acquisition, and thus there were few cases litigating
the issue.25 The second phase, which some people like and others do
not, developed a very simple theory of a taking. If the government
impaired your title or occupied your land, they took something. For
example, a reservoir that flooded your land without your permission
imposed an easement over your fee title and thus was a taking. The
title theory was applied in Augler v. Kansas.26 Kansas was one of the
first states to enact prohibition, and it shut down a brewery. The brew-
ery argued that its property had been taken. In effect, the Supreme
Court said "you still own the brewery, you just can't use it to manufac-
ture beer." Thus, there was no taking, merely a regulation of use. The
third stage is Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennslyvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon27 which introduced two core concepts that are still very much
with us today and that people are still trying to figure out how to apply.
First, Holmes rejected the Augler distinction between a taking as an
interference with title and an exercise of the police power. He col-
lapsed the distinction and held that regulation alone could constitute a
taking if it went too far. This is the law today. If regulation shrinks too
much value, it may be a taking even though there is no title interfer-
ence. Justice Holmes also introduced and sanctioned balancing the loss
to the individual against the public gain from the ordinance. Courts
are addicted to balancing, especially in Illinois. 28 The last stage, Penn
Central, grew out of an attempt by the New York City landmark com-
mission to block the development of an office tower over Grand Cen-
tral Station because the station was a landmark and the proposed
designs would be inconsistent with the preservation of the visual im-
pact of the landmark. The case attempts to restate the law of taking by
going somewhat beyond the balancing test and recasting it in terms of
the various tests that academic commentators had suggested.
All the academic tests have the one common feature. They try to
avoid an "either/or" impasse by looking at the purposes of the regula-
tion and drawing distinctions between permissible and impermissible
purposes.
Commentators have proposed four basic tests. The first two de-
scribe Supreme Court results, but the second two try to articulate more
25. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 105-123 (1973). In the
nineteenth century the chief users of eminent domain were private transportation companies. See
Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain in Earl, American Economic Development, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 1263.
26. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
27. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
28. See LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 Ill. 2d 344, 125 N.E.2d 609 (1955).
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general philosophical principles. The first test is the physical invasion
test.29 This test antedates the Federal Tort Claims Act. 30 The Court
had to find a theory to allow suits against the government for those
injured by physical invasions, such as flooding, and nearby government
activities that amounted to a common law nuisance. Not every physi-
cal invasion is a fully compensable taking, as the navigation servitude
cases illustrate.
3'
The second and broader test, a balancing test, compares the loss to
the individual against the gain to the government. This test is unfair, as
many have pointed out, because public welfare must be void of any
individual losses. 32 Any test that allows individual loses to be dis-
counted will result in a distorted welfare calculus. Efforts to build bet-
ter mousetraps have centered around two related tests.
The third test, which I call the "Chicago test," distinguishes be-
tween regulation where there is and is not an expectation of compensa-
tion. A basic distinction between harm prevention and public benefits
extraction is drawn. The test was first formulated by the first great law
professor of municipal government law, Ernest Freund 33 and was re-
fined by Professor Allison Dunham in the late 50's and by Professor
Robert Ellickson in the 1970's. Courts are asked to distinguish between
public action directed at nuisance prevention and that directed toward
the affirmative provision of benefits for the public. 34 The theory is that
it is proper for a city to regulate land uses to prevent nuisances because
the common law has long put people on notice that no one has a right
to maintain a nuisance. However, it is not proper to require someone
to dedicate his property to the general welfare of the community. In
Penn Central, Justice Brennan acknowledged this test at two points.
First, he characterized the purpose of the taking doctrine as the invali-
dation of regulations that unfairly require one individual to bear bur-
dens that are usually financed through taxation or other general
revenue-raising measures. Second, Justice Brennan stated that "gov-
ernment actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources
to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to
29. Washington Market Enterprises Inc., v. City of Trenton, 58 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408
(1975).
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 and widely scattered sections.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
32. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
33. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-547 (1904).
34. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basisfor City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958).
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constitute 'takings'. 35
Professor Dunham's harm-benefit test was subsequently refined by
Professor Joseph Sax to distinguish between the arbitration and enter-
prise functions of government.36 Professor Sax argued that when a
government arbitrates among landowners to try to prevent one from
harming the other it performs a common law - based function and no
compensation is due. A landowner is on notice of this government
function. In contrast, when government acts in an entrepreneurial ca-
pacity to acquire resources for the public generally, there is a risk that
government will act arbitrarily against isolated individuals. Both the
harm-benefit and arbitration-enterprise tests are premised on the dis-
tinction between nuisance prevention and welfare promotion. Profes-
sor Ellickson again recast the harm-benefit test in 1977. 37 He argued
that meaning can be given to the harm-benefit distinction because it
reflects ordinary landowner expectations about the scope of permitted
uses of their property. Thus, a regulation that would be ordinarily
characterized as a benefit extraction is presumptively unconstitutional:
A legal doctrine that compels a government to compensate those in-
jured by one of its programs can perform two useful functions. First,
it can prevent the cost of a public program from being arbitrarily
imposed on one group of individuals but not on another, ethically
indistinguishable group. Here the function of the doctrine is hori-
zontal equity - treating like people alike. Second, the doctrine may
serve the very different purpose of deterring legislatures from enact-
ing inefficient programs. When municipal officials are able to deflect
the costs of a public measure to those who lack the right to vote in
municipal elections (or who are vastly outnumbered at the polls), a
rule requiring compensation, by shifting the costs back to the electo-
ral majority, may help induce these officials to weigh more accurately
the costs and benefits of alternative measures.
The doctrines just proposed have been designed to promote the
goals of both horizontal equity and efficiency. The intuitive appeal
of the traditional harm-benefit test for takings springs from its pro-
tection of horizontal equity. When a legislature enacts a standard of
conduct that forces some individuals to confer benefits, it is holding
them to a standard that most other persons are not only not forced to
meet but are know to fall below.
38
35. 438 U.S. at 128.
36. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964). The distinction between
arbitration and enterprise functions potentially invalidates a great deal of environmental regula-
tion. Professor Sax seems to have abandoned this distinction in favor of one that validates much
more use of the police power. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149
(1971).
37. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J.
385, 418-424 (1977).
38. Id. at 420.
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The hard question, of course, is whether the distinction is valid. If
the purpose of land use regulation is to promote the efficient allocation
of resources, what is the difference between preventing harm and com-
pelling a benefit? Both functions are undertaken for the same end.
Both equally benefit and prevent harm. As Penn Central illustrates, it
is often difficult to apply the tests which suggests that the tests are
empty or so susceptible to abuse as to be useless. One could describe
the purpose of the New York ordinance as the compulsory dedication
of a building for the enjoyment of the public generally. Is there a dif-
ference between a landmark designation and an ordinance that zones
100 acres of private wood as a public park? The latter is a classic ex-
ample of the harm prevention-benefit extraction or the arbitration en-
terprise line between valid and invalid regulation. This example
suggests, as Professor Ellickson has argued, that the line between harm
and benefit is defensible because it is grounded in widely shared expec-
tations about the risks that a landowner faces from public regulation of
his use choices. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Penn Central made
the harm-benefit test the basis of his disagreement with the majority:
Where a relatively few individual buildings, all separated from one
another, are singled out and treated differently from surrounding
buildings, no such reciprocity exists. The cost to the property owner
which results from the imposition of restrictions applicable only to
his property and not that of his neighbors may be substantial-in this
case, several million dollars-with no comparable reciprocal benefits.
And the cost associated with landmark legislation is likely to be of a
completely different order of magnitude than that which results from
the imposition of normal zoning restrictions. Unlike the regime af-
fected by the latter, the landowner is not simply prohibited from us-
ing his property for certain purposes, while allowed to use it for all
other purposes. Under the historic landmark preservation scheme
adopted by New York, the property owner is under an affirmative
duty topreserve his property as a landmark at his own expense. To
suggest that because traditional zoning results in some limitation of
use of the property zoned, the New York City landmark preservation
scheme should likewise be upheld, represents the ultimate in treating
as alike things which are different.39
The fourth test is a refinement of the traditional dimunition in
value test. This test was more influential at the state rather than federal
level until it was recast in 1975 by Professor John Costonis. He argued
that a landowner is constitutionally entitled only to the reasonable ben-
eficial uses of his land.40 This test is, in effect, largely a restatement of
39. 438 U.S. at 140.
40. Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accomodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Im-
passe in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975). The most far reaching, but
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the harm-benefit test and is difficult to apply. However, it has consider-
able appeal because it reflects a public utility approach to regulation
that permits all regulations that allowed reasonable return on the land-
owner's investment. Further, it enables courts to distinguish between
past and speculative investments and to protect only the former.
C. FEDERAL AND ILLINOIS LAW CONTRASTED
Penn Central adds an important doctrinal refinement to the bal-
ancing test. The first prong of the primafacie case is the landowner's
allegation of dimunition in value-loss. In the majority opinion, Justice
Brennan said that the Constitution protects only "distinct investment-
backed expectations." This questionable distinction influenced by the
Costonis public utility theory, allows a court to distinguish between de-
veloped and undeveloped property. The theory must be that specula-
tors are not "real" investors. Why? Apparently because speculators
take greater risks compared to those who sink capital in property that
existing regulations will be changed. Further, speculators can more
easily absorb these losses compared to investors.
If loss is based on distinct investment-backed expectations, what
must one lose? Federal law is fairly clear that a city may constitution-
ally deprive a landowner of the highest and best use of his property.4'
Beyond this baseline, the line between regulation and taking is erratic.
Penn Central's wrinkle to the "no right to highest and best use rule" is
to recast (apparently) the loss rule as a public utility based fair rate of
return problem. In the case there is a very important footnote, 34,
which states that Penn Central conceded that it could obtain a reason-
able return from the existing terminal. A showing of no profitable use
for the property is the strongest primafade case, and the court had an
easy out to the taking claim by saying to Penn Central "you didn't
suffer a sufficient loss." Beyond this narrow reading of the case, the
opinion suggest that the Court may be moving toward a public utility
theory where the inquiry is the reasonableness of the rate of return.
The Court's treatment of an interesting but unresolved aspect of
the case-the off-setting compensation issue-also suggests adherence
to this theory. The city had offered Penn Central transferable develop-
ment rights (TDR's). TDR's allow property owners to sever some of
ultimately unsuccessful, attempt at a general theory of takings is B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). See also Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police
Power. The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
41. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20
Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
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the development potential site allowable under existing zoning for a
site and to transfer them to nearby property. The opinion does not
directly decide whether TDR's make an otherwise unconstitutional reg-
ulation constitutional. All the Court held was that Penn Central's get-
ting something "was relevant" to the question of what they lost.4 2
If off-setting benefits are relevant, the question becomes how
much? In Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion argued
that the statute was unconstitutional because it imposed a duty on the
landowner to benefit the public generally through the preservation of a
landmark.4 3 Justice Brennan responded to this normal application of
the harm-benefit test with the incredible statement that not only is there
a public benefit to the city of New York from Penn Central maintain-
ing the station, but "we cannot conclude that the owners of the Termi-
nal have in no sense been benefited by the Landmarks Law." 44 The
fiction of off-setting benefits is indefensible. If taken at face value, it
allows any statement of public benefit to count and renders any balanc-
ing totally meaningless.
Penn Central is full of incompletely worked out new directions to
the taking issue. On the basis of the result and dicta, the case has
widely been seen as an almost complete victory for public regulation.
Ironically, the case has ended serious interest in transferrable develop-
ment rights because TDR's are unnecessary for landmark and environ-
mental protection programs after Penn Central. However, it is
important to understand that there are two relatively narrow explana-
tions of the result. The first is that, despite all the talk about conclusive
presumptions of public benefit, the case is a simple no substantial loss
case. Penn Central's admission of a reasonable rate of return coupled
with the possibility of partial recoupment of the site's value through the
sale of TDR's just did not add up to the first prong of the primafacie
case. Second, there is a procedural explanation. Almost every major
Supreme Court taking case turned on a lack of ripeness. From Euclid
to San Diego Gas & Electric, the Court has avoided a detailed analysis
of the taking issue by finding that the issue was not ripe for review.
Illinois law uses a more conventional harm-benefit test. The dif-
ference is illustrated by Harris Trust, which is a replay of Penn Central.
The case involved an unsuccessful attempt to preserve the three Kel-
logg mansions in the block of 2900 North Lake Shore Drive. They are
42. 438 U.S. at 137.
43. 438 U.S. at 139-141.
44. 438 U.S. at 134-135.
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one of the very last rows of mansions from the era when the elite of
Chicago first turned north after their initial southward settlement pat-
tern. The property was zoned R8 in 1961 and down-zoned to R5 in
1979. The estate initially asked for a writ of mandamus for a demoli-
tion permit and for a money judgment. The city agreed to issue the
demolition permit if the estate dropped the money judgment claim.
After this settlement, the case became politicized. Independent alder-
man Martin Oberman, in whose district the mansions were located, at-
tempted to intervene after a final judgment had been entered.45 Shortly
after the attempted intervention the city designated the mansion as a
landmark.
Ultimately, the issue came down to the constitutionality of the
designation. The court concluded that too much value was shrunk
from the property. At the trial, a planner testified that the highest and
best use of the property was for the previous R8 zoning because of the
city's general policy to encourage high density development along the
lakefront. The property would yield $3,200,000 under the R8 versus
$1,780,000 under the R5, although there was the usual contrary evi-
dence that the R5 development would be economically feasible. The
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial and appellate opinions.46 As is
often the case, the real basis for the opinion is equal protection because
the city intervened too late to protect the mansions. 47 They were an
island of low density in an area of previously allowed high density de-
velopment. Benefit promotion versus harm prevention results are often
equal protection cases because there is no harm to the area from the
last increment of higher intensity development. There might be great
benefit to the public generally of having a little island of open space
there, but that is exactly the type of benefit promotion for which the
city should pay.
Although Illinois has a reputation as a pro-developer, anti-munici-
45. Harris Trust also is an important contribution to the law of intervention. The appellate
court held that neither an association of apartment owners who reside in an apartment building 18
feet from the property nor the ward's alderman could intervene. The association failed to allege
that the value of the apartment building would be decreased and that any of its members would
derive a benefit from the preservation of mansions different from the public generally. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), was cited. Alderman Oberman likewise could not intervene
because he failed to establish a personal interest, Harris, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 843-844, 435 N.E.2d at
136. His argument that he lost a right as a member of the City Council Finance Committee to
hear appeals from the denial of demolition permits for landmarks also was rejected because the
city in effect complied with procedures for Council participation in the permit process. The
Supreme Court affirmed. 95 I11. 2d 516, 449 N.E.2d 69 (1983).
46. 105 I11. App. 3d 839, 435 N.E.2d 139 (1981), aff'd, 95 Ill. 2d 516, 449 N.E.2d 69 (1983).
47. The court relied in part on Amdur v. City of Chicago, 638 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
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pality state, Illinois courts have become much more hospitable to zon-
ing tied to comprehensive plans. Harris Trust suggests that cities have
some flexibility to implement more rational zoning plans. Plans pro-
vide better evidence of the need for and rationality of the zoning com-
pared with conclusionary statements of local officials that are often post
hoc. In Harris Trust, the rationale for the zoning was not tied to a plan:
Jerry Jacobson, Deputy Commissioner of Zoning, testified for
defendants that the 1979 amendment resulted from a decision by the
city, in response to community and aldermanic concern, to downzone
various parcels of property within the area in order to reduce density.
Rather than adopt a comprehensive zoning amendment, the city
downzoned parcels in a piecemeal fashion. The only properties
downzoned were those not yet developed to the maximum density
permitted by the existing ordinance. Left intact were parcels already
developed to the maximum use allowed. Jacobson estimated that
nearly 90% of the land in the area had been downzoned in this piece-
meal fashion. Stating that his definition of highest and best use was
'one that best serves the needs of the community, and the City itself,'
he gave his opinion that the highest and best use of the subject prop-
erty was R5.
4E
Thus, it was easy for the appellate court to conclude:
the trial court found that the hardship to plaintiff was not justified by
any benefit to the public. The downzoning not only precluded plain-
tiff from a sale of the land but it also substantially reduced the value
of its property. While diminution in value alone does not suffice to
invalidate an ordinance, it must be shown that the public welfare
does not require the restrictions and resulting loss. . . . Testimony
as to public benefit was contradictory in the present case. Evidence
offered by plaintiff demonstrated that the policy of encouraging R8
development on lake-front property benefited the public. Defend-
ants' evidence revealed that lower density would benefit plaintiff's
neighbors. The trial court's determination that the hardship to plain-
tiff outweighed benefit to the public was not manifestly against the
weight of the evidence. 4
9
I
The Supreme Court affirmed, applying the LaSalle National Bank
test and stressed that, unlike other recent Supreme Court and Seventh
Circuit cases, "[t]he down-zoning precluded the negotiated land sale,
substantially reduced the value of the property, and impedes (sic) Har-
ris' fiduciary responsibilities as to its charitable obligations.
'50
CONCLUSION
No simple formula can fully capture all of the complex distribu-
48. 105 II. App. 3d at 848, 435 N.E.2d at 138.
49. Id. at 850, 435 N.E.2d at 139.
50. 95 I11. 2d 516, 449 N.E.2d 69 (1983).
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tion issues that arise in taking cases. However, at the present time the
harm-benefit test offers the best hope, despite all the difficulties of its
application, of making sense out of the cases.

